The objective of this study is to investigate the existence of a relationship between executive remuneration and financial performance in 28 Brazilian companies from the industrial sector.
Introduction
The importance of operations management has increased in the last years. Globalization of markets, increasing competition, shorter product and service life-cycles, and new technology have increased pressures on the operations function to improve productivity and provide highquality products and services. In this new scenario, operations function needs employees who are motivated and pledged with the goals of the company. The remuneration system is an important mechanism through which individual efforts are guided toward strategic business objectives.
Within the last few years, many researchers have tried to understand the nature of the relationship between executive remuneration and corporate financial performance. The underlying hypothesis is that the remuneration influences executive's behavior, which then, influences the company performance (DEVERS et al., 2007) .
The surveys that have studied the relationship between executive remuneration and corporate financial performance have mostly been carried out in United States, using data on American companies. These surveys have found little direct evidence of a positive relationship between executive remuneration and financial performance.
The lack of studies relating executive remuneration and corporate financial performance within the context of the Brazilian market has led us to carry out this research, with the objective to investigate the existence of a relationship between executive remuneration and financial performance in 28 Brazilian companies from the industrial sector.
Executive remuneration is measured in terms of the monthly salary, the variable salary and three indexes -of benefits, career and professional development -that we have created especially for this survey. Financial performance is measured in terms of sales growth, return on equity and return on sales. Both the data related to remuneration and the data related to financial performance are from year 2006. The study focuses on the remuneration received by directors, vice-presidents and company presidents.
We hope that this study expand knowledge about the relationship between executive remuneration and corporate financial performance, and thus provide grounds based on which the companies may improve their management systems.
Literature review and hypothesis

The concept of remuneration
There are several terminologies used to express the idea of remuneration. In Brazil, there is not on single terminology. Recently, there has been a growth in the use of the word remuneration in a wider sense, considering other factors besides the financial package (HANASHIRO, 2007) . In Figure 1 we show the concept of remuneration that we will use in this study. Financial remuneration is the "economic and/or financial compensation for work carried out by a person" (DUTRA, 2002, p. 181) . It can be divided into direct remuneration and indirect remuneration. Direct remuneration is the total cash amount received by the person in exchange for the work performed. It, in turn, includes fixed remuneration and variable remuneration (CHIAVENATO, 2000; DUTRA, 2002) . Fixed remuneration is the cash amount previously agreed between the employee and the company, paid on a regular basis for the work carried out. Normally, this is related to tasks and also to the position that the person holds within the company (DUTRA, 2002) . Variable remuneration is the cash amount received by the person for having reached certain targets beforehand between the employer and the employee.
Indirect remuneration is represented by the benefits that the company offers to its employees in exchange for the work executed, in order to provide security and comfort (DUTRA, 2002) .
Examples of benefits include: medical assistance, life insurance, retirement plan, company car and others.
Organizations regularly incorporate nonfinancial rewards in their compensation packages for employees (CARLON; DOWS; WEST-GRAY, 2006) . Aspects regarding career and professional development are two of the nonfinancial factors that are incorporated most often.
Regarding career, the companies offer support for career planning, executive outplacement policy, internal recruitment program and professional promotion. In relation to professional development, companies have used a process of ongoing learning, in order to develop, in their employees, competences that are considered of critical importance for the business.
Financial performance
The concept of financial performance is a dominant element in empirical research. However, there is no consensus as to which measurements should be used (CARTON; HOFER, 2006) . In order to find out which measurements were being used to measure performance of companied, Carton and Hofer (2006) This review revealed that the performance concept has multiple dimensions, a view that is shared by other authors such as Chakravarthy (1986) , Ramanujam (1986, 1987) , and Keats (1990) . Therefore performance has to be analyzed using more than one indicator. Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987) showed that the financial performance construct has at least two distinct dimensions: growth and profitability. Each of these dimensions may be described by one or more indicators. Profitability, for example, may be measured by indicators such as ROA, ROE and ROI. And growth may be measured by sales growth. Carton and Hofer (2006) propose the use of more than one accounting indicator to operationalize the financial performance construct. They point out that: − There is uniformity in the way the data is presented, as the financial statements are prepared according to a strict set of rules, the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
We investigate the existence of a relationship between executive remuneration (monthly salary, variable salary, benefits index, career index and professional development index) and corporate financial performance (sales growth, ROE and ROS). Our hypothesis can be stated as follows:
Hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between executive remuneration and corporate financial performance.
Methodology
We extract the data of the independent variables from the database held by Progep (Programa We choose industrial companies that have information in the two databases to compose the sample. Thus the non-probabilistic sample is composed of 28 Brazilian industrial companies.
As the sampling technique used is non-probabilistic, it shall not be possible to generalize the results obtained to the population as a whole. c) Executives' access to the following benefits: medical assistance, medical office in the company, dental assistance, subsidy of 50% or more to buy medicines, subsidy for less than 50% to buy medicines, psychological counseling, life insurance, subsidies for educational qualification, subsidies for professional specialization, subsidies for language studies, support to the executives' children education, subsidy to buy housing, financing and loans. For the benefit index, the value 2 was given to each benefit offered by the company to all its executives, the value 1 for each benefit offered by the company to part of its executives and 0 for each benefit that was not offered by the company to its executives. Then we sum the points and divide by the maximum score a company could get: 26 points (that is, the company offers all the benefits to all its executives). The percentage result corresponds to the benefit index.
For the career index we use the same criteria. The value 2 was given to each mechanism for career planning offered by the company to all its executives, the value 1 for each mechanism for career planning offered by the company to part of its executives, and 0 for each mechanism for career planning that was not offered by the company to its executives. Then we sum the points and divide by the maximum score a company could get: 50 points (that is, the company offers all the mechanism for career planning to all its executives). The percentage result corresponds to the career index.
For the professional development index we use the same procedure of the previous indexes.
The value 2 was given to each mechanism for professional development offered by the company to all its executives, the value 1 for each mechanism for professional development offered by the company to part of its executives, and 0 for each mechanism for professional development that was not offered by the company to its executives. Then we sum the points and divide by the maximum score a company could get: 16 points (that is, the company offers all the mechanism for professional development to all its executives). The percentage result corresponds to the professional development index. 
Results
In 2006, 28 sample companies together employed 115,233 employees and the sum of the gross sales of these companies represents about 10% of Brazilian GDP 2006.
First, we present the descriptive statistics of the data extracted from Progep database. Table 1 shows the benefits that the companies offer to their executives. All the sample companies offer "medical assistance" to all their executives. Eighteen companies offer to all their executives "medical office in the company". "Dental assistance" is offered by 89.3% of the companies to all their executives. "Life insurance" is offered to all the executives by 25 companies. "Subsidy to buy housing" is not offered to the executives on 89.3% of the companies. And "financing and loans" is offered to all the executives by 78.6% of the companies.
Twenty three companies have a formal process of planning professional development and this process is offered to all the executives. This process is conducted regularly, at least once a year, and as a result of this, a plan is developed on 85.7% of the companies (Table 2) . The outplacement policy is offered by 50% of the companies to all their executives. Ten companies do not monitor the process of executive outplacement (Table 4) . Fifteen (53.6%) companies offer internal recruitment program to all their executives. On 39.3% of the companies, the executives do not take part in the process for establishing the criteria for career progression (Table 5) . Only 11 companies offer to all their executives a career plan that is structured and formalized.
On 12 companies the executives do not know the requirements for access to the posts mentioned in the career plan (Table 6 ). Only 13 companies offer to their executives a retirement program. And on 12 companies this program involves financial aspects (Table 7) . The results point that companies are offering to their executives some support for professional development. The perspective of professional development in the company is the most value aspect to executives (FIA, 2008) . So, there are some opportunities that can be explored by the companies. Table 8 shows the mechanisms for professional development offered by the companies to their executives. On 24 companies all the executives have access to educational programs that are conceived based on the identification of competences. Not all the companies pay a variable salary to their executives. The average monthly salary is R$ 28,087.27, with the smallest and largest values being R$ 14,021.28 and R$ 52,000.00, respectively. The average variable salary is R$ 176,404.72. The benefits index measures executives' access to 13 benefits and ranges from 46.15% to 92.31%. The career index measures the support to career planning offered by the companies to their executives and ranges from 4.00% to 86.00%. The professional development index measures the mechanisms for professional development offered by the companies to their executives and ranges from 0.00% to 100.00%. Any companies do not offer any mechanism for professional development while another companies offer all the mechanism. The average sales growth is 4.03%, the average ROE is 17% and the average ROS is 6.46%. The natural logarithm of number of employee ranges from 5.98 to 9.91 (Table 10) . Low -companies which values of independent variables are lower than median High -companies which values of independent variables are higher than median Then, we use Mann-Whitney test to test the null hypothesis that the population mean are the same for the two groups. The results presented in Table 11 show p-value >5%. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for sales growth, return on equity and return on sales. We can reject the null hypothesis for sales growth (Table 12 ). But we cannot reject H 0 for ROE and ROS. So companies that offer larger amount as variable salary show higher levels of sales growth. Table 13 shows p-value <5%. So we can reject the null hypothesis for: sales growth, ROE and ROS. Companies that offer a wider range of benefits to most of their executives show higher levels of financial performance. The results of the test for career index show p-value >5% (Table 14) . We cannot reject the null hypothesis for sales growth, ROE and ROS. We can reject the null hypothesis for sales growth at the 0.10 level ( Table 15 ). Companies that offer mechanisms for professional development to most of their executives show higher level of sales growth. e) There is a relationship between professional development index and sales growth.
To verify the association degree between variables we use Pearson correlation test (Table 16 ).
The results of this test point:
a) There is a positive correlation between benefits index and sales growth (r = 0.34);
b) There is a positive correlation between benefits index and ROS (r = 0.36). #. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). Where: i = 1,…, n FP = financial performance (sales growth, ROE, ROS), (used alternately)
The results of multiple regression tests are not significant. The F statistics calculated for each model present p-value >5%. So, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (H 0 : β 1 = β 2 = … = β 6 = 0) that all the coefficients are simultaneously equal zero.
Conclusion
Operations function needs motivated employees to improve productivity and provide highquality products and services. The remuneration system is an important mechanism that it can help to operations function to reach these goals.
The objective of this study is to investigate the existence of a relationship between executive remuneration and financial performance in 28 Brazilian companies from the industrial sector.
This survey focuses on the remuneration received by directors, vice-presidents and company presidents.
To operationalize the remuneration we use the monthly salary, the variable salary and three indexes -of benefits, career and professional development -which have been created especially for this survey. To measure financial performance, we use three accounting indicators: sales growth, return on equity and return on sales.
The results of Mann-Whitney test suggest that there is a relationship between: variable salary and sales growth, benefits index and sales growth, benefits index and return on equity, benefits index and return on sales, and professional development index and sales growth.
Pearson correlation test point a positive correlation between benefits index and sales growth, and between benefits index and return on equity. The results of simple regression analyses show a statistically significant relationship between benefits index and sales growth, and between benefits index and return on sales.
Although there is strong support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between executive remuneration and corporate financial performance, the results of multiple regression analysis are not significant. Thus, new researches need to be developed.
This survey has some limitations. The companies selected for the sample are benchmarks in human resources management. This means that the sample may not be a true representation of industrial companies in general and, the results of this survey may not be generalized to the population as a whole.
The independent variables may be operationalized in ways other than those used in this research study, which calculated three indexes and used them as a proxy, for remuneration of executives.
Most of the companies in the sample have closed capital. The fact that in Brazil it is not mandatory for these companies to disclose their financial statements makes it harder to obtain financial data. In addition, the problem of handling accounting results, like those that happened in the recent past, show that the financial indicators may not present a true picture of the companies' realities. Indeed, the manipulation of figures may lead to distortion in the results of research.
In spite of these limitations, the results found are indeed relevant for a discussion about the relationship between executive remuneration and corporate financial performance.
